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STRENGTHENING SECURITY IN MALI WITH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT

by Marlène Dupouy [United Nations Mine Action Service]

When insurgent groups in Mali initiated a rebellion for independence in late 2011, the National Guard and the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) in Gao were at the forefront of hostilities, which included the pillaging of weapons from government stores. Concurrently, the demise of the Gaddafi regime in Libya triggered an influx of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) across the Sahel region and the return of fighters from Libya, making northern Mali their base. That challenge was quickly seized upon by jihadists and opportunists aiming to further destabilize Mali and enlarge their bases and activities throughout the Sahel region.

Often referred to as the real weapons of mass destruction, SA/LW play a critical role in the perpetuation and the spread of armed conflicts. Cheap, durable, and easily concealed, SA/LW remain the primary weapons of inter-community tensions, armed insurrections, armed rebel activities, or terrorism. The illicit proliferation, accentuated by the porous nature of borders in the region, has had a devastating effect on development, governance, and the everyday life of communities.

Since 2013, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has been mandated by Security Council resolution 2364 “to assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management.” The resolution also “calls upon the Malian authorities, with the assistance of MINUSMA ... and international partners, to address the issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.”

The UNMAS contribution to weapons and ammunition management (WAM) has been innovative and holistic by combining practical, safe storage solutions and tailor-made, on-site facility management training, complemented by in-depth trainings. Lessons learned from working in Mali as well as input from other UNMAS WAM programs, including Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, led to the development of a technical guide to improve standardization. More recently, the importance of WAM as a preventive measure against stockpile diversion has been further strengthened by Security Council resolution 2370.

Implementing Innovative Solutions

Mali is a vast, landlocked country of more than 1.2 million sq km (nearly 5 million sq mi). The roads connecting the south and north are in a poor state of repair and are often targeted by armed terrorist groups in an effort to disrupt supply chains. Furthermore, the loss of state control in northern regions for years combined with the latest crisis has exacerbated the poor infrastructure situation.

To respond to the priorities of the MDSF in such a complex operational context, UNMAS had to develop the most flexible, fit-for-purpose, and cost-effective solutions for weapons storage in remote areas. To reinforce the safety and security of government-owned SA/LW, UNMAS has proposed standardized solutions for the construction of temporary storage facilities. These armories consist of a 20 ft (6.1 m) container and offer a range of capacities from 100 to 220 weapons. Most include a separate compartment for small arms...
ammonium storage, with a capacity of approximately 2 metric tons (2.2 US tons). This ready-made solution can be implemented in one month with minimal supervision on site, thereby mitigating the risk of failure by local contractors. Containers are prepared in Bamako or other main cities before being transported and assembled on-site, thus limiting the risk of exposure of both local contractors and UNMAS personnel. This temporary and mobile solution allows the MDSF to move their storage facilities if need be. These turn-key rehabilitation projects are easily duplicable at a relatively low cost (USD$10,000 per unit).

To date, 22 such facilities have been constructed or rehabilitated in northern Mali, including remote locations such as Diré, Niafunké, Goundam, and Ménilaka. Additionally, to support the MDSF while on operational deployment, armory kit solutions were developed. The kits are composed of a container, metallic basement, mobile roof, ventilations, mobile solar panels, gun racks, unloading bays, etc., and are mobile, easily transportable, and fast to assemble in the field with minimal skills. They are intended to ease deployment and provide safer storage for both SA/LW and their ammunition. They can be installed with minimal technical knowledge, skills, and means.

The team in Mali pioneered a “Technical Booklet for temporary armories” that serves as a tool for learning and improving the quality of design and construction of weapons storage facilities across UNMAS field programs. Following this successful initiative, the focus of the team shifted to efforts at standardizing ammunition storage solutions. These turn-key solutions are easily applicable by the United Nations, NGOs, or private operators that constitute the WAM community.

Aiming to ensure sustainability through national ownership, Malian personnel in charge of newly rehabilitated armories also benefit from tailor-made WAM induction training. This three-day training package is delivered on-site and is aimed at supporting the operationalization of the armory and enhancing the capacity of the MDSF to operate safely. The training is conducted in parallel to other qualifying WAM training in Bamako. Complementing these safe storage initiatives, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training, mentorship, and specialized equipment were provided to support a national capacity to conduct bulk demolitions.

**Contributing to Stabilization Efforts**

Improved WAM contributed to stabilization and redeployment efforts by enabling the MDSF to access safe SA/LW and ammunition stockpiles in areas of operation, as well as by impeding the pilfering of weapons and ammunition stocks and their deployment during hostilities in Mali. All uniformed services deployed in remote areas—namely the MDSF, the Water and Forestry units, the Customs and the Penitentiary Administration—have benefited from such support. Among them, the National Guard is the most decentralized service and often targeted by terrorist attacks across the country. The National Guard plays a critical role in the redeployment of state authority in the most remote areas with direct contact with local populations. The rehabilitation of weapons and ammunition storage areas in central and northern Mali, as well as the provision of trainings, contribute to the return of state authority in these areas by strengthening the capacity of state institutions—in this case Malian Defense and Security Forces to securely store their weaponry. In addition, it helps to foster the conditions that are necessary for the redeployment of MDSF in central and northern Mali. UNMAS has supported this security force with the rehabilitation of armories in Gao, Ménilaka, and soon-to-be Gossi, as well as with the delivery of various WAM induction trainings that enable the National Guard to be operational and to prevent looting of national stockpiles.

When interviewed on 7 August 2017, the commanding officer of the National Guard in Gao highlighted that UNMAS assistance helped to support stabilization efforts and that a positive impact was noticed on the ground. He emphasized that the WAM trainings contribute to raising awareness of personnel on the importance of applying best practices in order to avoid stockpile diversion and accidents. Moreover, he stressed the significant impact of implementing rehabilitation projects in rural areas as a positive signal for local administrations and populations and a significant contribution to stabilization efforts in Mali.

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See endnotes page 66
Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [from page 4].

1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim-operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines.

2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase Humanitarian Mine Action.

3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.


5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.


7. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.

8. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or whether the IED is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.


11. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, and abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’

12. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO – all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.

13. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition – ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.’ The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty.


15. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.

Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improved Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [from page 9].

1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.

2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ elements of mine action.


8. Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikoulu, Krttz, and Trancart [from page 14].


10. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).


Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [from page 18].


2. MAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.mags.es.


4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili.

5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.


7. The UNSAS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while casualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100 other countries in the database comes to more than 50.

8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitiative.org.


References:


2. Strengthening Security in Mali With Weapons and Ammunition Management by Dupuy [from page 23].

3. Publishing with scholarship:\n

Clearing Landmines and Building Peace in Colombia by Finson and Diffendert [from page 25].


