Start Date
4-12-2019 10:40 AM
End Date
4-12-2019 10:55 AM
Description
The airline industry generates billions of euros and dollars of revenue each year for the European and American economies. Despite similar levels of economic development, modernization, and number of passengers taking to the skies each year, airline competition in the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) varies significantly. This paper aims to further explain why airline competition varies so greatly in the U.S. compared to the EU despite their similarities in other aspects. While acknowledging that a multitude of factors have contributed to the variation, the present paper focuses on governmental structural differences between the EU and the U.S. Specifically, it highlights the causal role of historical developments in regulatory measures and lobbying. The research examines a wide variety of policy documents, court cases, and lobbying statistics to support this claim. It specifically explores DOJ antitrust investigations, the post-9/11 airline market, and lobbying procedures in the U.S. When assessing the EU market, various EEC regulations, the Single European Act, Commission initiatives, and the lobbying work of A4E are specific cases of analysis. The result shows that the different nature of European and American economic philosophy, combined with the different historical developments and influence of lobbying over policymaking, supports the claim put forth.
Chair
Aydin Yildirim
Discussant
Elsa Massoc
Session Type
Panel 1
Topic
Political Economy & Trade
Explaining Airline Competition Differences Between the EU and U.S.
The airline industry generates billions of euros and dollars of revenue each year for the European and American economies. Despite similar levels of economic development, modernization, and number of passengers taking to the skies each year, airline competition in the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) varies significantly. This paper aims to further explain why airline competition varies so greatly in the U.S. compared to the EU despite their similarities in other aspects. While acknowledging that a multitude of factors have contributed to the variation, the present paper focuses on governmental structural differences between the EU and the U.S. Specifically, it highlights the causal role of historical developments in regulatory measures and lobbying. The research examines a wide variety of policy documents, court cases, and lobbying statistics to support this claim. It specifically explores DOJ antitrust investigations, the post-9/11 airline market, and lobbying procedures in the U.S. When assessing the EU market, various EEC regulations, the Single European Act, Commission initiatives, and the lobbying work of A4E are specific cases of analysis. The result shows that the different nature of European and American economic philosophy, combined with the different historical developments and influence of lobbying over policymaking, supports the claim put forth.
