Start Date
4-24-2018 5:30 PM
End Date
4-24-2018 6:00 PM
Disciplines
Socio-Economic Issues
Description
Croatia’s accession to the European Union in 2013 showed Western Balkan countries that EU accession is an attainable goal and a way to improve quality of life in the region. Further, the European Union is interested in accepting these countries as a way to stabilize its own neighborhood. However, one of the biggest issues for Balkan countries is eschewing histories of institutional corruption to illustrate that their institutions comply with EU standards. This paper uses lobbying regulatory typologies to understand how Balkan countries amend their lobbying laws to meet EU standards. Using the Slovenian case as a model, we compare lobbying regulations in Montenegro and Macedonia to those adopted in Slovenia. Ultimately this paper finds that lobbying regulations in Slovenia and Macedonia fit the “transparency-seeking” typology while the Montenegrin lobbying reforms match the “hard-regulatory” typology. Despite issues with implementation, Macedonian lobbying reform is closer to meeting EU standards than lobbying reform in Montenegro because the Macedonian reform closely resembles Slovenian reform that brought the nation from being considered the 17th most transparent government in Europe to the most transparent in just a few years. Ultimately, this paper concludes that lobbying reform is a tactic that western Balkan governments employ to bring their institutions in line with EU values, and that the more these reforms mirror the Slovenian case, the more likely they are to meet EU accession criteria.
Seeking Democracy: Bringing Legitimacy to Balkan Institutions through Lobbying Reform
Croatia’s accession to the European Union in 2013 showed Western Balkan countries that EU accession is an attainable goal and a way to improve quality of life in the region. Further, the European Union is interested in accepting these countries as a way to stabilize its own neighborhood. However, one of the biggest issues for Balkan countries is eschewing histories of institutional corruption to illustrate that their institutions comply with EU standards. This paper uses lobbying regulatory typologies to understand how Balkan countries amend their lobbying laws to meet EU standards. Using the Slovenian case as a model, we compare lobbying regulations in Montenegro and Macedonia to those adopted in Slovenia. Ultimately this paper finds that lobbying regulations in Slovenia and Macedonia fit the “transparency-seeking” typology while the Montenegrin lobbying reforms match the “hard-regulatory” typology. Despite issues with implementation, Macedonian lobbying reform is closer to meeting EU standards than lobbying reform in Montenegro because the Macedonian reform closely resembles Slovenian reform that brought the nation from being considered the 17th most transparent government in Europe to the most transparent in just a few years. Ultimately, this paper concludes that lobbying reform is a tactic that western Balkan governments employ to bring their institutions in line with EU values, and that the more these reforms mirror the Slovenian case, the more likely they are to meet EU accession criteria.
