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Abstract
Since the end of the World War II, China and Vietnam had been “brotherly comrades,” yet they went to war in 1979. This paper argues that fluctuations in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship around the Vietnam War occurred largely as a result of converging and diverging core national interests of China and Vietnam. Chinese foreign policy, particularly toward Vietnam, was principally driven by security interests. During the first two Vietnam Wars, the presence of the capitalist powers, especially the United States, in Vietnam directly threatened China’s territorial security. Therefore, China actively collaborated with North Vietnam to fight against the so-called “containment” policy. However, mutual distrust and conflicting post-war ambitions in Indochina fueled tensions between the two countries, leading to the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979.
Explaining the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance and Conflicts from 1950-1979
Since the end of the World War II, China and Vietnam had been “brotherly comrades,” yet they went to war in 1979. This paper argues that fluctuations in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship around the Vietnam War occurred largely as a result of converging and diverging core national interests of China and Vietnam. Chinese foreign policy, particularly toward Vietnam, was principally driven by security interests. During the first two Vietnam Wars, the presence of the capitalist powers, especially the United States, in Vietnam directly threatened China’s territorial security. Therefore, China actively collaborated with North Vietnam to fight against the so-called “containment” policy. However, mutual distrust and conflicting post-war ambitions in Indochina fueled tensions between the two countries, leading to the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979.