Publication Date
2010
Faculty Department
Department of Philosophy and Religion
Document Type
Article
Abstract
There is much controversy surrounding the nature of the relation between fictional individuals and possible individuals. Some have argued that no fictional individual is a possible individual; others have argued that (some) fictional individuals just are (merely) possible individuals. In this paper, I offer further grounds for believing the theory of fictional individuals defended by Amie Thomasson, viz., Artifactualism, by arguing that her view best allows one to make sense of this puzzling relation. More specifically, when we realize that the view allows for an identification of merely possible individuals with fictional individuals, we see that the utility, and hence the level of credence lent to Artifactualism, is increased. After arguing for this thesis, I respond to three of the most pressing worries.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
“Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 80, No. 1 (2010)
